

The Question of Détente

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In one of the series of CRIA Conversations, in which distinguished speakers address themselves to current political issues, Dr. Hans Morgenthau spoke on "Détente." This article is derived from his opening statement and the conversation that followed. Dr. Morgenthau is a trustee of CRIA and chairman of the editorial board of Worldview.

Détente is one of those concepts that perhaps only a theologian is qualified to discuss, because it is a general, abstract concept that can mean anything to anybody. Indeed, the main attraction of the concept lies in this generality and abstractness. Obviously, you cannot come out against détente and in favor of bigger and better tensions. No more than you can come out against peace and in favor of war. Or in favor of hatred and against the brotherhood of man. Thus we are dealing with a concept that in itself is perfectly meaningless. It means nothing to say that there is détente between the United States and the Soviet Union without going down the list of points of tension and asking yourself what has happened with those tensions because of a so-called détente.

Let me say, without belaboring the point, that to approach foreign policy in terms of détente is not helpful at all. It obscures the real issue. It gives you the illusion that you have understood something about foreign policy when actually you have obscured the real issues with which foreign policy has to deal.

If you go down the list of issues and examine them in view of whether tensions have been increased or abated or have disappeared altogether, you'll find that there is one geographical region where there is indeed a clear and unmistakable abatement of tensions. It is a region to which the United States has contributed little by way of détente. This region is the center of Europe and, more particularly, Germany.

When former Chancellor Brandt initiated his *Ostpolitik*, when he recognized the eastern frontiers of Germany, when he recognized the legitimate existence of an East German state and the sovereign government governing it, he indeed abated tensions that had existed since the end of the Second World War between the Soviet Union and the West. It was exactly the unresolved issue of Germany, of its position among the nations, and more particularly the unresolved issue of

the eastern frontiers of Germany that had given rise to the cold war, and to legitimate concerns of the Soviet Union, whose European empire and western frontiers it saw threatened by the nonrecognition of a powerful West Germany, which, allied as it is to the United States, was still a power to reckon with even in its truncated form.

Thus when Chancellor Brandt declared the recognition by West Germany of the East German state and of the eastern frontiers of Germany, he actually declared the cold war to have come to an end. This is the great achievement of the last ten years as far as Europe and the abatement of tensions, that is, détente, are concerned. You can perhaps say, if you want to stretch the point a little, that détente has also resulted from a certain degree of abstention by the Soviet Union in Southeast Asia and in the Middle East. But here I think we are already in the field of speculation, and I don't want to pursue that point any further.

If you consider the overall relations between the United States and the Soviet Union, you find that in one respect, which is intangible and not substantive, there is in them a kind of tension, which has abated during Mr. Nixon's Presidency and Mr. Kissinger's stewardship of American foreign policy. The ideological commitments of the United States and of the Soviet Union had resulted in a crusading spirit that for too long a time dominated the American approach to world politics. This crusading spirit, which divided the world into good and bad nations, peaceful nations and aggressor nations, has virtually disappeared, at least from American-Soviet relations.

You need only read the State of the World messages President Nixon submitted to the Congress in order to be forcefully reminded of the almost complete lack of reference to communism or the worldwide aspirations of communism in those documents. In other words, for the last six years or so the United States has ap-

proached, if not international relations in general, at least relations with the two major Communist powers, China and the Soviet Union, in what you might call a businesslike spirit. It has looked at them as two great powers with which it has certain interests in common and from which it is separated by other, differing interests. This, of course, has been the traditional political and nonideological approach to foreign policy.

This approach has made possible meaningful negotiations on substantive issues both with the Soviet Union and China, for as long as you looked at China, and to a lesser extent in recent years at the Soviet Union, as the source of all evil in the world, and you looked at yourself as the incarnation of virtue in the world, and at neutral nations as being lukewarm and really morally defective (such as India in the mind of Mr. Dulles), as long as you approached international relations from this moralistic and crusading point of view, there was no possibility for negotiations. You don't negotiate with the devil. You wait for the ultimate—and inevitable—triumph of virtue over evil. Today you have an entirely different approach to foreign policy. Mr. Kissinger negotiates with the leaders of the major Communist powers in a businesslike spirit, and the fact of their being Communist is a minor consideration that is not allowed to disturb his businesslike conversations and negotiations with them.

I should hasten to add that this businesslike approach to the major Communist powers is not necessarily duplicated in our approach to the minor Communist powers. For when it comes to Chile or Greece or Cuba, or when it came to Indochina, we approached those issues not in a businesslike, but in a crusading, way. That is to say, we approached those issues in terms of communism. We could not tolerate a Communist regime in Latin America. There are complicated reasons for this kind of bifurcation of approaches, in which the present Administration and Mr. Kissinger have dealt with the great Communist powers in a businesslike way and with the small Communist powers in a crusading way.

What is called *détente* is an absence of the crusading passions that have made businesslike relations and the contractual abatement of tensions impossible between the United States, on the one hand, and the Soviet Union and China, on the other. Insofar as those relations are concerned we must also consider a new opportunity that has opened up for the United States and that the United States has successfully used to a certain extent. That is to say, the United States today takes an intermediate position between the Soviet Union and China. Both are anxious not to see the United States embracing the other Communist power, since both the Soviet Union and China today regard their own conflict much more seriously than they regard their conflict with the United States.

So the United States today occupies, within admittedly narrow limits, a very advantageous position. This reminds one a little bit—and I don't want to exaggerate the analogy—of the position

Great Britain occupied from the time of Henry VIII to that of Sir Edward Grey with regard to the controversies of the European Continent. That is to say, it can shift its weight from one side to the other, making one side anxious at one time and the other side anxious at another time and thereby gain certain advantages.

I would guess that as far as the liquidation of the Indochina war is concerned, and also insofar as the peace efforts in the Middle East are concerned, the United States has made successful use of this privileged position. The very presence of Mr. Kissinger in Peking testifies to the vitality of this position, for Mr. Kissinger has already made the point that he looks unfavorably on any kind of hegemonism. Obviously the only country that can qualify is the Soviet Union. And certainly the Soviet Union will be concerned about this statement and will try to find out to what extent Mr. Kissinger has become the victim of the charms of Mao Tse-tung and to what extent he is still open to the charms of Mr. Brezhnev.

So you find today that the most ardent supporter of NATO is China. For the very simple reason—which was as familiar to Thucydides as to Machiavelli, to Talleyrand as to Bismarck—that the enemy of your enemy is your friend. And as far as Indochina is concerned, certainly the lack of any tangible response from either China or the Soviet Union when we bombed North Vietnam and mined its harbors can only be explained as a by-product of the development to which I have referred. Similarly, the virtually complete abstention of the Soviet Union from intervening in the Middle East, at least openly, in the course of the step-by-step negotiations of Mr. Kissinger points, I think, in the same direction.

Also the negotiations concerning the limitation and control of nuclear arms would certainly not have been so comprehensive if there had not been a change in the political atmosphere that was felt both in Moscow and Washington. So when we speak of *détente*, we ought to keep in mind not the vague and amorphous conception of *détente* that suggests good will and fraternity and whatnot, but concrete issues, and ask ourselves at every step to what extent individual issues and points of friction have yielded to the statesmanship of the governments concerned.

(The meeting was then opened to questions and comments.)

*I should like to ask Professor Morgenthau whether he takes seriously Kissinger's repeated statement that the cause of *détente* is that we don't want to blow one another to smithereens with atomic weapons.*

Of course I take that seriously, but this is not a discovery of Mr. Kissinger's. This has been clear since 1945. I mean this is, as Sherlock Holmes would say, elementary.

Obviously both the United States and the Soviet Union during the last thirty years have pursued their foreign policies with regard to each other with a degree of caution unprecedented in the history of otherwise hostile nations. Any number of issues would have led to

war between Russia and the United States in the preatomic age. They have not led to war exactly because of this fear that you don't want to come too close to the nuclear abyss.

Perhaps I should sharpen the question a little. Doesn't Kissinger take a more businesslike attitude toward this than John Foster Dulles did, and aren't the two countries taking a more businesslike attitude toward their potential to destroy one another?

This is entirely correct. In his approach to great power foreign policy surely Mr. Kissinger is as far removed from the point of view of Mr. Dulles as one can imagine. If you think of an analogy, you really ought to think of Bismarck. History will show whether Kissinger will be as successful as Bismarck was, but in terms of how to think and act on foreign policy, he is much more a disciple of Bismarck than of anybody else.

Dr. Morgenthau, how do you account for the bifurcation of a businesslike approach to China and the Soviet Union and an ideological approach to the smaller powers?

I think that the distinction lies in the fear of Mr. Kissinger that the communization of a country means an extension of either Russian or Chinese power. Thus it is an implicit threat to the world balance of power. And more particularly, he probably also has a feeling about the domino theory, a positive feeling, that if communization starts in Chile and is not contained in Cuba, it will spread to Argentina and any number of nations. The whole rationale of our intervention in Indochina is based upon exactly this kind of position. And although Mr. Kissinger supported our official policy with regard to Indochina even before he came into the government, he privately has made no bones about his distaste for it. When he came to power, his first order of business was to liquidate the American involvement in Indochina. I once asked him what he thinks his place in history will be, for what he will be remembered, and he said: "I will be remembered for two things—that I got the United States out of Indochina and that I brought China back into the community of nations."

I think we know the limitations of détente in making certain progress in human rights. That has been discussed a great deal. But what about the great limitations in making progress on disarmament, the collusion almost between the United States and the Soviet Union in many levels of disarmament? Can you talk about that?

The nuclear disarmament negotiations partake of the same difficulties we are aware of in the history of conventional disarmament. And the outcome, which already is on the horizon, is likely to be exactly the outcome of the Washington Conference on Naval Disarmament of 1922. That is to say, you will get disarmament of some kind in terms of certain obsolescent types of weapons, while the contracting parties will remain free to develop the new weapons, the weapons of the future. As you will remember, in the

Washington Treaty of 1922 the dreadnoughts were abolished by the United States, Great Britain, France, Italy, and Japan. And Japan was put into an inferior position with regard to the overall strength of its navy. But then the nations concerned made an effort to compete with each other in smaller vessels, submarines, and so forth.

In other words, they agreed to abolish those armaments they would have abolished anyhow for technical reasons. And this is what you are going to get, if I'm not mistaken, with the SALT II agreements. That is to say, fixed land-based missiles are obsolete. They are too vulnerable to be retained, so you will get a limitation on those. And the sea-based missiles and the cruise missiles, which have a motor of their own and can travel up to 2,000 miles while being directed by computers from an airplane on the ground—these will be the order of the day. Furthermore, there is the possibility that the introduction of lasers into the armory of nations will lead to the obsolescence of the airplane, because airplanes would simply become so vulnerable they could no longer be used.

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I have two questions. First, do you think that Kissinger is going to be remembered for getting us out of Vietnam, considering the number of bodies that were strewn in the way from the time he started talking about it till he got it done?

He may be remembered negatively....

Second, is his present thing about China and Ford's trip to China anything other than Ford trying to replay the Nixon political game?

Sure, but Mr. Ford does not engage in diplomatic negotiations. Mr. Kissinger does. And you may ask me whether I agree with Kissinger. I abstain from voting, because one has to wait until the returns are in. I mean you can't say now what he will be remembered for, because he's not at the end of his stewardship of our foreign relations.

But the China thing is important?

Yes, I would say extremely important, because in my view it was twenty years overdue.

The Ford trip is important for the prestige it gives the

whole relationship, a seriousness it would not have if the President had not gone to Peking. These diplomatic formalities have an importance of their own. For instance, at the Potsdam Conference with Churchill, Stalin, and Truman the question arose about who should walk first into the meeting room. Obviously, Truman didn't want Stalin to be the first. Stalin didn't want Truman to be the first. Nobody wanted Churchill to be the first. So they found a room with three doors and they entered simultaneously.

You may say, "How silly!" But it's very important. Bismarck at a dinner was once asked, "Where is the head of the table?" And he said, "Where I sit is the head of the table!"

I wonder whether you felt that the U.S. has given somewhat more than it received in the last negotiations on arms limitation?

I personally would not say so. The criticism of the nuclear arms agreements is based upon—and the whole policy of the Pentagon with regard to nuclear arms is based upon—an atavistic conception of nuclear weapons. That is to say, there is an irresistible tendency to regard nuclear weapons as simply a quantitative extension of conventional weapons. As General LeMay said, "A nuclear bomb is just another bomb." Nothing could be farther from the truth. A nuclear weapon is something qualitatively utterly different from anything humanity has ever seen. When you deal with machine guns or pieces of artillery, you operate in a military economy of scarcity, because there are always more targets available than you have weapons to deal with them. And so the conventional arms race is inevitable in a society of sovereign nations. You can manipulate it, but you cannot get rid of it.

But when you deal with nuclear weapons, you are operating in a military economy of abundance. That is to say, you have a destructive capacity that by far exceeds any possible target you could think of. In terms of nuclear weapons the United States today has the equivalent of two tons of dynamite for each man, woman, and child living on this earth. The United States could blow up the whole world. And the Soviet Union, with fewer warheads, could do the same thing. In other words, when it comes to nuclear weapons, you reach an optimum beyond which you don't need to go. You are able to destroy your enemy under the worst of conditions five times over. You don't gain anything by arming to the extent that you are able to destroy him eight times over. Nor is your enemy who can destroy you only four times over inferior to you on that account.

That simple syllogism has not yet penetrated the high command of the Pentagon. In theory, if I talk to a general he would say "of course." But when you come to the application of that simple syllogism, you find that he would continue to act in terms that were entirely appropriate before 1945 but are completely obsolete now.

I wonder if you can comment on attempts to link freedom of emigration from the Soviet Union to various U.S.-Soviet agreements or interchanges.

Yes. You see, there exists an organic relationship today between the domestic policies of a country and its foreign policy. That hasn't been always so. When foreign policy was a kind of aristocratic pastime, it really didn't make any difference what kind of aristocracy you had in power. But under present conditions, the way a government deals with its own people is indicative of how it will deal with other people. Mr. Sakharov in his new book has made this point very eloquently. So I find it quite in order that we tie certain economic or financial concessions to certain concessions from the other side in the field of human rights and civil liberties.

In light of your comment about Mr. Kissinger's reaction to the expansion of communism in Cuba, would you comment on United States policy toward the recent events in Portugal?

I don't know anything firsthand about what policies we've been pursuing. I think at the beginning we were completely surprised and had no policy at all. We now have a policy of supporting the democratic elements against the Communists. I find this policy entirely in order. Especially since, from a democratic point of view, there can't be any doubt about the minority status of the Communist Party.

Do you see any significance in the restraint of our reaction in Portugal compared with our reaction in some earlier roughly similar instances?

I think your question is well placed. If this had happened in 1950, it is an open question what we would have done. But we have had some experience since. We have been in Indochina and come out of it. Furthermore, the fanaticism and inferiority complex that existed in the fifties don't exist today. In the fifties we thought that a Communist regime in any particular country was a catastrophe for the United States, that it was a kind of denial of everything we stood for and had to be prevented.

We are now taking, at least when it comes to the larger countries, a position of equanimity. I mean if a country wants to go Communist, we try to prevent it, but if we can't prevent it, so be it. I don't know whether we would apply this to Latin America, but we certainly apply it to countries where obvious intervention would carry enormous risks. We can't send an army into Portugal without risking a worldwide conflagration, no more than you could send an army into Hungary or Czechoslovakia.

But this shows again the enormous restraint under which both antagonists in the cold war have operated. Let me give you an example with regard to the Soviet Union. In 1959 and '60 Khrushchev presented us with two ultimatums concerning our presence in West Berlin. One had a time limit of six months. The other had a time limit of the end of the year. We completely disregarded these ultimatums, and Khrushchev didn't follow up on them at all, which would have been inconceivable any time before 1945.

Do you think Kissinger's policies are stifling innovation

in the political field, in the economic field, inasmuch as they tend to press for choice between capitalism on the one hand and communism on the other, leaving us no other alternative?

I really don't think so. He has given speeches that were quite forward-looking, intellectually interesting.

My question goes back to a couple of questions ago, the question of human rights in the Soviet Union as they relate to détente. You said you're in favor of some kind of linkage there. But beyond the issue of emigration, what issues are we supposed to link with what concrete issues?

A very good question. Of course, you can single out certain practices of certain individuals and say, as long as those practices continue we are not going to do such and such. You see, if you look at the actual practices in the Soviet Union with regard to dissidents, certainly the public pressure has had a very considerable effect upon the fate of certain individuals whose freedom and life were spared and others who were allowed to emigrate.

If Solzhenitsyn had not been such a world figure, you can be sure he would not now reside in Switzerland. And if Sakharov were not such a world figure, he would certainly have been arrested long ago. And what happens to him in the future is a very open question. So there is a linkage. There's a natural linkage between certain drastic violations of human rights and the foreign policy we or any other nation may pursue. Especially when it comes to benefits the other side very, very badly would like to have.

I wonder whether you'd agree with a restatement of your definition that détente as Kissinger sees it really means that we have now agreed with the Soviets and China that the three of us do not have to fear any conflagration between the United States and the Soviet Union and China. But that the United States has given clear warning that the rest of the world is more subject to our pressures than these large countries.

We have become completely accustomed to judging certain events and tendencies harshly and then to act on that judgment. The historic compromise in Italy between Christians and the Communists, for example. Since, however, those tendencies are evidently not going to disappear, I see very grave danger.

If tomorrow there were a coalition in Italy between the Communists and the Christian Socialists, we would not welcome it, but we are not going to do anything about it for the very simple reason that we can't do anything about it.

Or if in the next French elections the joint candidate of the Communists and the Socialists is elected President of France, we will deplore it, but we can't do anything about it. We deplored De Gaulle and we couldn't do anything about him.

Looking at the Middle East and the step-by-step diplomacy of the Secretary, it becomes apparent that in the last two years or so, maybe since the '73 war, the role of the Soviet Union has been progressively reduced. And it has become apparent that this has

happened with the acquiescence of the Soviet Union. They've made no great fuss. They may have grumbled, done something in Eritrea or Somali. But what are the long-range implications of this extension of America's balance of power? And is this on the whole a wise thing to have been so exclusively American?

The main purpose of Mr. Kissinger's Middle Eastern policy has been to reduce, or if possible to eliminate, the Russian presence in the Middle East. In other words, you have a revival of the Eastern Question that pitted Russia against Great Britain in the nineteenth century. And Mr. Kissinger really foresees the possibility of a reduction of Russian influence in Iraq and Syria similar to that which occurred in Egypt. The concomitant of this triumph of his diplomacy would, of course, be an increased responsibility of the United States. This goes without saying.

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I'd like to go back to your opening statement that détente really obscures, or the use of the term obscures, the real issues. I agree with that. I'm wondering whether you would comment on the continuing obfuscation of foreign policy matters vis-à-vis the use of such terms.

Well, of course there is a technique of government that tries to get as large a popular support as possible, and vague terms such as complete and general disarmament, peace, détente, isolation, intervention, all lend themselves to this kind of pragmatic use.

To what degree do you feel that the businesslike, nonjudgmental type of approach to foreign policy is in fact a result of wisdom or realism, or of a jaded, frustrated, disappointed, and/or defeated idealism? Or is there really what could be called a true death of idealism here, proper or improper as it may have been, or is it just a surcease for a season?

I would guess that it is a well-thought-out policy. Mr. Kissinger has a philosophic conception of what the world is like and what he wants to bring about, and this is reflected in his policy. Now of course he has to deal with the heritage of the past. He has to deal with democratic preferences, emotions, and he has to deal with the bureaucracy and the executive branch itself, which is in good measure hostile to him. It is a testimony to his political ability that he was able to keep

himself in power under Nixon, through the last chapter of Nixon, and is doing so now under Ford. I mean this is in itself a very considerable accomplishment.

I've heard it said in Washington that Mr. Kissinger is the best politician in Washington. And he is certainly very good.

I just wanted to revert to the interesting example you gave of détente at the beginning. Willy Brandt's Ostpolitik could be interpreted as satisfying almost entirely the Russian desire for a recognition of a fait accompli. In the light of that, could you comment at all on the Helsinki agreements and to what extent they are significant?

The Helsinki agreement, first of all, is not a legally binding convention. It is a declaration of intention. And it is, of course, surrounded by qualifications and exceptions and so forth. It will be as effective as the major participants want it to be. But in itself I think it is a kind of symbolic seal upon the recognition of the legitimacy of the territorial dispositions in Eastern Europe. The Soviet Union, for some reason I'm not able to understand completely, insisted upon this kind of thing. Even after Brandt had recognized the status quo, they wanted to have a seal by the European nations, by the members of NATO, the United States and Canada, outside of Europe. That is what they got.

The so-called humanitarian aspect is really a concession to the West for its recognition of something that of course existed and couldn't be changed. But I would doubt it will have very much of a humanitarian effect upon the fate of individuals, as its wording was intended to suggest.

You implied earlier that the major reason for the unprecedented restraint of the great powers had been nuclear weapons and the threat carried in them. A two-part question now. Perhaps three. One, do you anticipate a time within this century in which international affairs will not be conducted under the threat of nuclear warfare? Two, would you welcome that? And three, how might you see it coming about?

Well, the second question I can easily answer. Of course I would welcome it. But I doubt that it will come about in this century. I would very much doubt that. You see there is now what I find a frightening tendency certainly in our military establishment—and this has been going on for twenty-five years—to find a decent way to use nuclear weapons. People assume that there must be a way in which we can use nuclear weapons without blowing ourselves to kingdom come. You can write the history of atomic weaponry in terms of one attempt after the other to find a way to do that. Now we hear again arguments in favor of counterforce strategy, which was first presented by McNamara in his speech at the University of Michigan in 1963 or '64. It's of course an absolute absurdity. You have now estimates of American casualties in consequence of a so-called limited nuclear war, applied only to military objectives, that range from a couple of million to a hundred million.

Nobody has ever raised the question I raised when

Herman Kahn published his book on nuclear war. What is going to happen to the hundred million corpses, and what is going to happen to the survivors in terms of health and in terms of psychology? Will people simply say the next morning, "Where is Emily? We can't find her. Well, it's one of those things, let's go to the office." This is not going to happen. I mean people will go crazy and people will die in droves in consequence of the pestilence that will occur. Mr. Kahn in his scientific, quantitative book never mentions this issue. And nobody else has ever mentioned it as far as I can tell. So this is a real threat: People under the illusion of being able to limit a nuclear war will no longer be adverse to coming close to it and one day will fall into the nuclear abyss.

And then of course you have the problem of proliferation. But if the SALT agreements don't succeed, you're bound to have proliferation en masse. For the nonproliferation treaty has only been a temporary success while the prospective new nuclear powers waited for the old, established nuclear powers to take care of nuclear arms control and disarmament. When this appears to be out of the question, they will ask, as India has asked, Why should we not have nuclear weapons if China should? In what respects are we inferior to China that we should not have them? And the Indians have them now. And the Pakistanis will ask tomorrow, Why shouldn't we have them? When the Pakistanis have them, the Afghans will ask, Why shouldn't we have them?

The very word détente suggests a basically negative policy, a policy of limiting nuclear armament, of restraining political influence in certain parts of the world. Isn't there a positive side to this coin? There seems to be in speeches that emanate from Washington a genuine search for cooperative, positive endeavors that would not simply continue restrained violence, but that would invite cooperation in dealing with developing countries in medical problems, in education, in a great many fields. Is this an important aspect of détente?

It has nothing to do with détente. Détente has only something to do with the relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union where there has been tension, where there is still tension. Where there is no tension you don't have détente. So you are perfectly correct in saying that détente has a negative connotation. You have tension and you either limit the tension or you eliminate it, and that is détente. If you are not tense to begin with, you can't be the object of détente.

Would you address the dangers of, or the necessity for, relying on one man in foreign policy?

Certain public functions can only be performed by one man. I mean you have one President. You don't have six Presidents. We have one Secretary of State, who is responsible for the conduct of American foreign policy. You can't have a committee. Congress can obstruct the policies of the Administration. Congress can qualify, change, or amend it or defeat it altogether,

but Congress cannot substitute its own foreign policy for the one it has rejected. The Senate rejected the Treaty of Versailles, the League of Nations, the permanent involvement of the United States in international affairs, and in consequence you had no policy at all. Because Congress cannot, five hundred-odd people cannot, conceive and conduct foreign policy. So for better or for worse, you have to rely on one man for the Presidency and one for the Secretary of State.

I am interested in your impressions of Mr. Kissinger's ability, and I wonder if you wouldn't attribute his survival to the fact that the country is in crisis at this point. We let Nixon get off without a trial, and stability was a prime problem.

But Kissinger survived all this and was involved only marginally. This testifies to his political intelligence. And I don't think that it was just a kind of oversight by the American people to let him stay in power. You can, as some observers have done, devise a catalogue of Mr. Kissinger's sins. But you still need a successor who comes up to the ability he has. And some of the people who attack him, of course, have shown an almost indecent interest in getting his job. He is simply, in my view, the ablest Secretary of State we have had since Dean Acheson, and probably one of the six or so best Secretaries of State we have had since the beginning of our history.

I'd like to ask whether part of the price that we are paying for détente and the heavy emphasis on big power diplomacy hasn't been the benign neglect of Latin America and the Third World countries generally?

Let me suppose I were Secretary of State and you would tell me, "You have to stop the benign neglect of Africa and Latin America." What am I supposed to do? I think you wouldn't know what I should do, and neither do I. For this reason, for decades people have made speeches about Latin America and Africa, but haven't done anything about it because they couldn't do anything about it. Look at all the new countries that have just entered the United Nations. I mean to call them countries is already a misnomer. They are spots on the map that have become independent nations by virtue of the decolonization of the world. And many of them are deficient in one or the other or all or most prerequisites of nationhood.

I'd like to go back to the human rights issue in line with détente. While Kissinger is pursuing détente, as you pointed out, he insists upon the crusade attitude or ideological line toward the small Communist nations, despite the fact that many, many people are under oppression in allied countries. I'm thinking particularly of South Korea. Kissinger at one time said that for American influence we have to pursue our national interests even when human rights are at stake. Now, I'm not sure what American interests are. What does he mean by that?

In general, of course, by national interests he means the safety, the integrity, of the American territory and

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the American way of life, and in consequence the maintenance of the world balance of power that safeguards those values. Everything else is subordinated to that. So Kissinger has no direct interest, no genuine direct interest, in the happiness of South Korea or the fate of Egypt or Israel. I mean those are pawns in the world chess game he is playing. You may object to this on moral grounds, but this is the way it is.

I'm puzzled by two of the statements that you just made. You were defining the purpose of the Secretary of State as the protection of the territorial integrity of the United States and the American way of life. But Kissinger's reference to the rights of the people of the Soviet Union to emigrate on the basis of human rights was a reference to the need for American foreign policy to respond not only to exterior pressures but also—I think you used the word—domestic policy concerns. I was wondering whether we do not need to affirm domestic interests and domestic policies and domestic values in relationship to our foreign policy. Isn't there a median way between the Dulles and the Kissinger approaches that affirms concern for human rights in Korea or wherever as a genuine part of American foreign policy rather than dealing with them as a pawn in a chess match?

Yes, I think there is what I regard as a weakness in Mr. Kissinger's general conception of foreign policy. He finds that official concern for the humanitarian aspects we have been discussing interferes with the pursuit of foreign policy as he understands it. And even though it sounds self-contradictory, it is incumbent upon a realist philosophy of foreign policy to consider these humanitarian aspects insofar as American foreign policy is concerned. For you cannot pursue American foreign policy without regard to certain moral principles for which this nation stands and that are reflected in its domestic policies.

An old historic nation such as France or Great Britain doesn't have this problem. But we as Americans are part of a polity based upon the consent of the governed to certain moral principles, most eloquently formulated in the Declaration of Independence. Either our generation or the few generations ahead of ours came to America in affirmation of certain principles that were supposed to be realized in America. If they are no longer realized in the domestic and foreign policies of America, this principal tie that keeps America together is loosened, if not destroyed. I think here is a blind spot in Kissinger's overall conception of what American foreign policy is all about.