

tem are presented clearly and concisely. The consequences of the Foreign Service Act of 1980 (the design and passage of which owes much to the author) are carefully laid out. So too are the problems the 1980 act did not solve, for example, the specialist versus generalist controversy, the role of families, the public image. Much material is presented in tabular form, and some of this—like the career sketches offered in the introduction and the “Dilemmas of Personnel System Design” after chapter four—adds a valuable third dimension to the work. Because of its comprehensive and systematic approach, the book will be required reading for many years for anyone involved in thought, talk, or action on this subject.

*Staffing for Foreign Affairs* also contains a number of important insights, most notably that, however great the diversity of the tasks assigned to those in the foreign affairs field, their principal difference lies in whether they are carried out overseas or in Washington. This distinction cannot fail to have a major impact on the whole pattern of selection, training, assignment, and promotion that is at the heart of any personnel system.

Mr. Bacchus’s ideal for overseas work is not much different from that of the established Foreign Service. He emphasizes traditional diplomatic skills, although he does point out that, ironically, just as the Foreign Service’s stress on the diplomat as manager was reaching its peak, the size of U.S. programs to be managed was decreasing. His description of what is required of Washington’s foreign affairs bureaucrats focuses on the “new issues agenda.” For a role model he chooses the “policy synthesizer”—one who is adept at blending all the different interests within the Executive’s expanded foreign affairs community and public and congressional concerns, thus producing an effective and defensible foreign policy.

The Foreign Service Act of 1980, with its Foreign Service/Civil Service system, is seen by the author as a major step toward a personnel system designed to meet this dual need. First, it provides for greater continuity in Washington and for increased specialization among those who work in Washington and overseas; and it makes possible, although it does not guarantee, a personnel management system run by personnel professionals.

Much of this makes eminent good sense. But before we are able to pass final judgment on who and what our foreign affairs professionals should be, we need another book—one on the same subject by an overseas professional. Mr. Bacchus’s view is

primarily from Washington, and Washington is only half of the foreign affairs equation. The overseas half has a point of view too, and this is not well represented in the present volume.

This matter of the key roles in foreign affairs and the kind of person best fitted to play them brings us to an argument that parallels the one about career professionals versus political appointees as ambassadors. No one denies that the ideal is to combine knowledge of the United States, its interests and policies, with skill and experience in dealing with foreign peoples and problems. Personifications of the ideal are rare, however, and the real question is whether it is easier to teach politicians about foreigners or professional diplomats about America.

The answer, of course, varies with the people involved. You can teach some politicians (and “policy synthesizers”) about foreigners and some professional diplomats (and other expatriates) about America. Others you cannot. But you can never—if our foreign policy is to have any rationality and consistency at all—have two separate groups going their own way, one synthesizing in Washington and one persuading and negotiating in the field. The idea that this kind of personnel approach, even when modified to provide for exchange and integration, is desirable grows out of the false concept of the nature of policy-making held, often understandably, by those who feel themselves closest to and most keenly aware of that most sacrosanct of government functions.

Today, policy has the absolutist flavor that theology had in the Middle Ages. National decisions are assumed to be the product of an inspired but rational structure crowning the public cosmology. Once pronounced by the learned doctors, policy can be readily carried out by well-trained technicians and specialists; in medieval terms, by parish priests, wandering friars, and cloistered monks. But then a Francis of Assisi, a Peter the Hermit, or a Martin Luther springs up, or a Black Death, Mongol invasion, or industrial revolution comes along and it becomes quickly apparent how ephemeral and transitory is established theology/policy. The churches finally learned that the word and the act are inseparable; it’s time governments did too. If Foreign Service Officers would benefit from a knowledge of how hard it is for the State Department to respond to congressmen who, in turn, must respond to their constituents, so too would Washington policy synthesizers benefit from a knowledge of the derision, incredulity, and hostility with which many of their high-tech syntheses are greeted around the world.

However, Mr. Bacchus cannot be faulted for not having written a different book. What he did produce is comprehensive, generally balanced, and thoughtful. All Americans and non-Americans interested in how we carry on our foreign affairs will benefit from it—and most particularly our career diplomats. :WV

**RELIGION AND POLITICS  
IN THE MODERN WORLD**  
edited by Peter Merkl  
and Ninian Smart

(New York University Press; ix + 276 pp.; \$30.00)

*John E. Becker*

Although the editors express the hope that this book will be a “major crossing” of the artificial boundaries between two disciplines, the boundaries seem for the most part to remain intact. The “ground-breaking” essays of the first section, with the exception of Raimundo Panikkar’s “Religion or Politics: The Western Dilemma,” are sketchy, salting discussions of nationalism with a few loosely used religious terms. Panikkar posits an existential dilemma: “Religion without politics becomes uninteresting, just as politics without religion turns irrelevant.” Panikkar likes neologisms, “sempeternity,” and “advaitic,” but his discussion is stimulating and en-



“Bertram, who do you know  
who would send us  
an un-recycled Christmas card?”

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